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The Need for Safe Autonomy
• Satellite servicing (DARPA
Phoenix Mission)
• Automated rendezvous
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The Need for Safe Autonomy
• Satellite servicing (DARPA
Phoenix Mission)
• Automated rendezvous
Key Question
How do we implement a general, automated spacecraft
planning framework with hard safety specifications?
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Original Contribution
Our work:
1. Establishes a provably-correct framework for the
systematic encoding of safety specifications into
the spacecraft trajectory generation process
2. Derives an efficient one-burn escape maneuver
policy for proximity operations near circular orbit
2 / 20
Sampling-Based
Spacecraft Safety
J. Starek, B.
Barbee, M. Pavone
Autonomous
Vehicle Safety
Spacecraft Safety
Active Safety with
Positively-Invariant Set
Constraints
CWH CAM Policy Design
Numerical
Experiments
Conclusions
Future Goals
Previous Work
Spacecraft rendezvous approaches with explicit
characterizations of safety:
• Kinematic path optimization [Jacobsen, Lee, et al.,
2002]
• Artificial potential functions [Roger and McInnes,
2000]
• MILP formulations [Breger and How, 2008]
• Safety ellipses [Gaylor and Barbee, 2007] [Naasz,
2005]
• Motion planning [Frazzoli, 2003]
• Robust Model-Predictive Control [Carson,
Ac¸ikmes¸e, et al., 2008]
• Forced equilibria [Weiss, Baldwin, et al., 2013]
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Types of Spacecraft Rendezvous Safety
• Passive Trajectory Protection: Constrain
coasting trajectories to avoid collisions up to a
given horizon time
• Active Trajectory Protection: Implement an
actuated escape maneuver to save/abort a mission
Design Choice
We emphasize active safety as it is the
less-conservative approach
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Vehicle Trajectory Safety
Definition (Trajectory Safety Problem)
For all possible failure times tfail ∈ Tfail and failure
modes Ufail(x(tfail)), we seek a sequence of admissible
actions u(τ) ∈ Ufail(x(tfail)) from x(tfail) such that
the remaining trajectory is safe.
Examples:
• Rovers/Land vehicles: Come to a complete stop
• Manipulators: Return to previous configuration,
disengage, or execute emergency plan
• UAV’s: Enter a safe loiter pattern
• Spacecraft: Less straightforward; generally require
mission-specific solutions (with human oversight)
5 / 20
Sampling-Based
Spacecraft Safety
J. Starek, B.
Barbee, M. Pavone
Autonomous
Vehicle Safety
Spacecraft Safety
Active Safety with
Positively-Invariant Set
Constraints
CWH CAM Policy Design
Numerical
Experiments
Conclusions
Future Goals
Vehicle Trajectory Safety
Definition (Trajectory Safety Problem)
For all possible failure times tfail ∈ Tfail and failure
modes Ufail(x(tfail)), we seek a sequence of admissible
actions u(τ) ∈ Ufail(x(tfail)) from x(tfail) such that
the remaining trajectory is safe.
6 / 20
Sampling-Based
Spacecraft Safety
J. Starek, B.
Barbee, M. Pavone
Autonomous
Vehicle Safety
Spacecraft Safety
Active Safety with
Positively-Invariant Set
Constraints
CWH CAM Policy Design
Numerical
Experiments
Conclusions
Future Goals
Vehicle Trajectory Safety
Definition (Trajectory Safety Problem)
For all possible failure times tfail ∈ Tfail and failure
modes Ufail(x(tfail)), we seek a sequence of admissible
actions u(τ) ∈ Ufail(x(tfail)) from x(tfail) such that
the remaining trajectory is safe.
6 / 20
Sampling-Based
Spacecraft Safety
J. Starek, B.
Barbee, M. Pavone
Autonomous
Vehicle Safety
Spacecraft Safety
Active Safety with
Positively-Invariant Set
Constraints
CWH CAM Policy Design
Numerical
Experiments
Conclusions
Future Goals
Vehicle Trajectory Safety
Definition (Trajectory Safety Problem)
For all possible failure times tfail ∈ Tfail and failure
modes Ufail(x(tfail)), we seek a sequence of admissible
actions u(τ) ∈ Ufail(x(tfail)) from x(tfail) such that
the remaining trajectory is safe.
Failure
6 / 20
Sampling-Based
Spacecraft Safety
J. Starek, B.
Barbee, M. Pavone
Autonomous
Vehicle Safety
Spacecraft Safety
Active Safety with
Positively-Invariant Set
Constraints
CWH CAM Policy Design
Numerical
Experiments
Conclusions
Future Goals
Vehicle Trajectory Safety
Definition (Trajectory Safety Problem)
For all possible failure times tfail ∈ Tfail and failure
modes Ufail(x(tfail)), we seek a sequence of admissible
actions u(τ) ∈ Ufail(x(tfail)) from x(tfail) such that
the remaining trajectory is safe.
Failure
6 / 20
Sampling-Based
Spacecraft Safety
J. Starek, B.
Barbee, M. Pavone
Autonomous
Vehicle Safety
Spacecraft Safety
Active Safety with
Positively-Invariant Set
Constraints
CWH CAM Policy Design
Numerical
Experiments
Conclusions
Future Goals
Vehicle Trajectory Safety
Definition (Trajectory Safety Problem)
For all possible failure times tfail ∈ Tfail and failure
modes Ufail(x(tfail)), we seek a sequence of admissible
actions u(τ) ∈ Ufail(x(tfail)) from x(tfail) such that
the remaining trajectory is safe.
Failure
6 / 20
Sampling-Based
Spacecraft Safety
J. Starek, B.
Barbee, M. Pavone
Autonomous
Vehicle Safety
Spacecraft Safety
Active Safety with
Positively-Invariant Set
Constraints
CWH CAM Policy Design
Numerical
Experiments
Conclusions
Future Goals
Vehicle Trajectory Safety
Definition (Trajectory Safety Problem)
For all possible failure times tfail ∈ Tfail and failure
modes Ufail(x(tfail)), we seek a sequence of admissible
actions u(τ) ∈ Ufail(x(tfail)) from x(tfail) such that
the remaining trajectory is safe.
Failure
6 / 20
Sampling-Based
Spacecraft Safety
J. Starek, B.
Barbee, M. Pavone
Autonomous
Vehicle Safety
Spacecraft Safety
Active Safety with
Positively-Invariant Set
Constraints
CWH CAM Policy Design
Numerical
Experiments
Conclusions
Future Goals
Challenge: Infinite-Horizon Safety
Finite-horizon safety guarantees can ultimately violate
constraints:
Failure
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Idea: Positively-Invariant Sets
Definition (Positively-Invariant Set)
A set Xinvariant is positively invariant with respect to
x˙ = f (x) if and only if
x(t0) ∈ Xinvariant =⇒ x(t) ∈ Xinvariant, t ≥ t0
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Idea: Positively-Invariant Sets
Definition (Vehicle State Safety)
A state is safe if and only if there exists, under all
failure conditions, a safe, dynamically-feasible
trajectory that navigates the vehicle to a safe, stable
positively-invariant set.
Failure
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Finite-Time Trajectory Safety
minimize
tf,x(t),u(t)
J(x,u, t)
subject to x˙(t) = f (x(t),u(t), t) (Dynamics)
x(t0) = x0 (Initial Condition)
x(tf) ∈ Xinvariant (Invariant Termination)
u(t) ∈ Ufail(x0) (Control Admissibility)
gi(x,u) ≤ 0, i = [1, . . . , p] (Inequality Constraints)
hj(x,u) = 0, j = [1, . . . , q] (Equality Constraints)
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Challenge: Solving the Finite-Time Safety
Problem under Failures
For a K -fault tolerant spacecraft with N control
components (thrusters, momentum wheels, CMG’s,
etc), this yields:
Nfail =
K∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
=
K∑
k=0
N!
k!(N − k)!
total optimization problems (one for each Ufail) for
each failure time tfail.
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Idea: Simplify the Finite-Time Safety Problem
Theorem (Sufficient Fault-Tolerant Active Safety)
1. From each x(tfail), prescribe a Collision-Avoidance
Maneuver ΠCAM(x) that gives a horizon T and
escape sequence u that satisfies x(T ) ∈ Xinvariant
and u(τ) ⊂ U for all tfail ≤ τ ≤ T .
2. For each failure mode Ufail(x(tfail)) ⊂ U(x(tfail))
up to tolerance K, check if u = ΠCAM(x) ⊂ Ufail.
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Idea: Simplify the Finite-Time Safety Problem
Theorem (Sufficient Fault-Tolerant Active Safety)
1. From each x(tfail), prescribe a Collision-Avoidance
Maneuver ΠCAM(x) that gives a horizon T and
escape sequence u that satisfies x(T ) ∈ Xinvariant
and u(τ) ⊂ U for all tfail ≤ τ ≤ T .
2. For each failure mode Ufail(x(tfail)) ⊂ U(x(tfail))
up to tolerance K, check if u = ΠCAM(x) ⊂ Ufail.
Key Simplifications
Removes decision variables u, reducing to:
• a test of escape control feasibility under failure(s)
• numerical integration for satisfaction of dynamics
• an a posteriori check of constraints gi and hj
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Safe Sampling-Based Spacecraft Planning
Solution is in exact form required for sampling-based
motion planning.
Restrict burns to nodes
Actively-safe Sampling-based
Spacecraft Planning
Restrict planning to
actively-safe nodes
Incorporating Safety Constraints:
• Add CAM policy generation to sampling algorithm
• Include CAM-trajectory collision-checking in tests
of sample feasibility
13 / 20
Sampling-Based
Spacecraft Safety
J. Starek, B.
Barbee, M. Pavone
Autonomous
Vehicle Safety
Spacecraft Safety
Active Safety with
Positively-Invariant Set
Constraints
CWH CAM Policy Design
Numerical
Experiments
Conclusions
Future Goals
Example: CAM Policy Design
Using CWH Set Invariance for CAMs
KOZ
Circularization RIC
Reference Line
Chaser
Circular Clohessy-Wiltshire-Hill (CWH) CAM policy:
1. Coast from x(t) to some new T > t such that
x(T−) lies at a position in Xinvariant.
2. Circularize the orbit at x(T ) such that
x(T+) ∈ Xinvariant
3. Coast along the new orbit (horizontal drift along
the in-track axis) in Xinvariant
14 / 20
Sampling-Based
Spacecraft Safety
J. Starek, B.
Barbee, M. Pavone
Autonomous
Vehicle Safety
Spacecraft Safety
Active Safety with
Positively-Invariant Set
Constraints
CWH CAM Policy Design
Numerical
Experiments
Conclusions
Future Goals
Example: CAM Policy Design
Using CWH Set Invariance for CAMs
KOZ
Circularization RIC
Reference Line
Chaser
Circular Clohessy-Wiltshire-Hill (CWH) CAM policy:
1. Coast from x(t) to some new T > t such that
x(T−) lies at a position in Xinvariant.
2. Circularize the orbit at x(T ) such that
x(T+) ∈ Xinvariant
3. Coast along the new orbit (horizontal drift along
the in-track axis) in Xinvariant
14 / 20
Sampling-Based
Spacecraft Safety
J. Starek, B.
Barbee, M. Pavone
Autonomous
Vehicle Safety
Spacecraft Safety
Active Safety with
Positively-Invariant Set
Constraints
CWH CAM Policy Design
Numerical
Experiments
Conclusions
Future Goals
Example: CAM Policy Design
Choosing the Circularization Time, T
CWH Finite-Time Safety Problem:
Given: x(t),u(τ) = 0, t ≤ τ < T
minimize
T
∆v2circ(T )
subject to x˙(τ) = f (x(τ),0, τ) (Dynamics)
x(τ) 6∈ XKOZ (KOZ Avoidance)
x(T+) ∈ Xinvariant (Invariant Termination)
Key Result
Can be reduced to an analytical expression that is
solvable in milliseconds
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Scenario
• Simulates an automated approach to LandSat-7
(e.g., for servicing) between pre-specified waypoints
• Calls on the Fast Marching Tree (FMT∗) algorithm
for implementation
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Scenario
• Simulates an automated approach to LandSat-7
(e.g., for servicing) between pre-specified waypoints
• Calls on the Fast Marching Tree (FMT∗) algorithm
for implementation
Assumptions:
• Begins at insertion into a
coplanar circular orbit
sufficiently close to the target
• The target is nadir-pointing
• The chaser is nominally
nadir-pointing, or executes a
“turn-burn-turn” along CAMs
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Scenario
• Simulates an automated approach to LandSat-7
(e.g., for servicing) between pre-specified waypoints
• Calls on the Fast Marching Tree (FMT∗) algorithm
for implementation
Constraints:
• Plume impingement: No
exhaust plume impingement
• Collision avoidance:
Clearance of an elliptic
Keep-Out Zone (KOZ)
• Target communication:
Target comm lobe avoidance
• Safety: Two-fault tolerance to
stuck-off failures
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Motion Planning Problem
Motion planning query:
16 / 20
Sampling-Based
Spacecraft Safety
J. Starek, B.
Barbee, M. Pavone
Autonomous
Vehicle Safety
Spacecraft Safety
Active Safety with
Positively-Invariant Set
Constraints
CWH CAM Policy Design
Numerical
Experiments
Conclusions
Future Goals
Motion Plan Comparison
Motion planning solutions:
17 / 20
Sampling-Based
Spacecraft Safety
J. Starek, B.
Barbee, M. Pavone
Autonomous
Vehicle Safety
Spacecraft Safety
Active Safety with
Positively-Invariant Set
Constraints
CWH CAM Policy Design
Numerical
Experiments
Conclusions
Future Goals
Motion Plan Comparison
Motion planning solutions:
17 / 20
Sampling-Based
Spacecraft Safety
J. Starek, B.
Barbee, M. Pavone
Autonomous
Vehicle Safety
Spacecraft Safety
Active Safety with
Positively-Invariant Set
Constraints
CWH CAM Policy Design
Numerical
Experiments
Conclusions
Future Goals
Success Rate Comparison
Success comparison as a function of thruster failure
probability, computed over 50 trials:
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Conclusions
Key Ideas
1. Use termination constraints inside safe, stable,
positively-invariant sets for infinite-horizon
maneuver safety
2. Embed invariant-set constraints into
sampling-based algorithms for safety-constrained
planning
Synopsis
• Demonstrated the idea for failure-tolerant circular
CWH planning
• CAM policies can be precomputed oﬄine for more
efficient online computation
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Future Work
Future Goals
• Extend to thruster
stuck-on and
mis-allocation failures
• Account for localization
uncertainty
• Apply these notions to
small-body proximity
operations
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Thank you!
Joseph A. Starek, Brent W. Barbee, and
Marco Pavone
Aeronautics & Astronautics Navigation and Mission Design
Stanford University NASA GSFC
jstarek@stanford.edu
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Sampling-Based
Motion Planning
Optimal Motion Planning
FMT∗
Clohessy-Wiltshire-Hill (CWH) Equations
• Motion is linearized about
a moving reference point
in circular orbit:
x = [δx , δy , δz , δx˙ , δy˙ , δz˙ ]T
u = 1m [Fx ,Fy ,Fz ]
T
• Yields LTI dynamics:
x˙ = Ax + Bu
A =

0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
3nref2 0 0 0 2nref 0
0 0 0 −2nref 0 0
0 0 −nref2 0 0 0
 B =

0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

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Generalized Mover’s Problem
Definition (Optimal Motion Planning Problem)
Given X , Xobs, Xfree, and J , find an action trajectory
u : [0, T ]→ U yielding a feasible path x(t) ∈ Xfree
over time horizon t ∈ [0, T ], which reaches the goal
region x(T ) ∈ Xgoal and minimizes the cost functional
J =
∫ T
0 c(x(t),u(t))dt.
Characteristics:
• PSPACE-hard (and therefore NP-hard)
• Requires kinodynamic motion planning
• Almost certainly requires approximate algorithms,
tailored to the particular application
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